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Bitter Friends
How Relationships between Violent Non-State Actors Form, Are Used, and Shape Behavior
 
   
 
 
Laila A. Wahedi
Georgetown University
 
 
  April 19, 2017
 
 
 

Created with {Remark.js} using {Markdown} + {MathJax} + {Liminal}

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Bloody Benefactors
A Model of Transregional Terrorist Sponsorship in Civil War
 
   
 
 
 

 
 
 
Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

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Asset Specificity:

Groups are good at different things

 

Local Groups

  • Local Infrastructure
    • Local Networks
    • Local legitimacy
    • Territory

 

Transregional Groups

  • Global Infrastructure
    • Donor Networks
    • Training, intelligence
    • Global legitimacy
Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu
3 / 19

Who Transregional Groups Want:



Ideologues

✘

Weak Groups

✘

Strong Groups

✔

Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu
4 / 19

Strong Local Groups


  • Prefer autonomy
  • Have what they need Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu
5 / 19

Anti-Social Networks
The Effects of Violent Group Cooperative Network Structure on Capacity
 
   
 
 
 

 
 
 
Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

6 / 19

Beyond Direct Partnerships


Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu
7 / 19

Effect of Local Structure


  • Contextualized Knowledge

  • Specialization

  • Leverage

  • Coordination

  • Focal Point

  • Security

Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

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Findings


Violence

  • More Violence
  • Positive but diminishing marginal returns to partnership

Survival

  • Well connected groups survive longest

Violence

  • Less Violence
  • Negative diminishing marginal returns to partnership

Survival

  • Well-connected groups die soonest

Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

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Devils in the Details
Learning and Diffusion in Networks of Violent Groups
 
   
 
 
 

 
 
 
Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

10 / 19

Theory


Groups must adapt to survive

  • Adopting new tactics helps them adapt

Adopting and sharing tactics is risky

  • Sharing implies revealing secret operational procedures
  • Adopting risks operatives and reputation

Partnerships help reduce the costs of sharing and adopting

  • Partners less likely to leak information
  • Helps groups learn to do it right the first time
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Modeling Challenges


Endogeneity

  • Propensity to adopt or learning?
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Modeling Challenges


Endogeneity

  • Propensity to adopt or learning?

Time Polynomials:

  • Look at propensity to adopt at a given time
    • Given partner use in the recent past
    • Given no use previously
    • Straight forward interpretation
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Modeling Challenges


Endogeneity

  • Propensity to adopt or learning?

Time Polynomials:

  • Look at propensity to adopt at a given time
    • Given partner use in the recent past
    • Given no use previously
    • Straight forward interpretation

Activity Periods:

  • Groups that don't exist cannot adopt a tactic
  • Need to go back in time to observe first adoption

Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

14 / 19

Multi-Level Logit


Illicit Organizations Have Secrets

  • Random baseline for each group over time
  • Add covariates we have
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Multi-Level Logit


Illicit Organizations Have Secrets

  • Random baseline for each group over time
  • Add covariates we have

Different Tactical Difficulty

  • Randome baseline of adoption of each tactic type
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Multi-Level Logit


Illicit Organizations Have Secrets

  • Random baseline for each group over time
  • Add covariates we have

Different Tactical Difficulty

  • Randome baseline of adoption of each tactic type

Interpretation

  • Probability of a given group adopting a given tactic in a month contingent on failure to adopt in the past, and whether a partner used that tactic.

Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

17 / 19

Evidence of Diffusion


Groups are more likely to adopt tactics their partners have used

Well-connected groups in centralized networks are most likely to adopt from partners

Well-connected groups in decentralized networks are least likely to adopt from partners

Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

18 / 19

Note on Final Draft


Graduate School asked me to remove the abstract sections from the papers

19 / 19

Bloody Benefactors
A Model of Transregional Terrorist Sponsorship in Civil War
 
   
 
 
 

 
 
 
Laila A. Wahedi -- Follow along at Wahedi.US, under Current Presentation -- law98@georgetown.edu

2 / 19
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